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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996), and this Court has pour-over jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in dismissing plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint as a 
sanction for plaintiffs persistent and willful dilatory behavior in complying with 
discovery requests? 
This Court reviews the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion, according broad 
deference to the trial court. 
Even though dismissal of a noncomplying party's action is one of the "most severe 
of the potential sanctions that can be imposed," it is clear from the language of rule 
37 that it is within a trial court's discretion to impose such a sanction. "'Because 
trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery process, they are 
given broad discretion regarding the imposition of discovery sanctions.'" Thus 
[appellate courts] have long held that [they] will not interfere unless "'abuse of 
that discretion [is] clearly shown' [and] trial courts are granted a great deal of 
deference in dismissing a case as a discovery sanction." 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co, 938 P.2d 271, 274 & 276 (Utah 1997) (citations 
omitted). See also Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260,262 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) ("[U]nder Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court . . . has 
broad discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations, including 
dismissing the noncomplying party's action."). 
1 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(2) If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court 
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others the following: 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings 
until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, 
or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(d) Failure of party to . . . respond to [discovery]. 
If a party . . . fails . . . to serve a written response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the court in which the 
action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), 
(B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) & (d). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
In this case, plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order dismissing her medical 
malpractice action against defendants J. Jay Oldroyd, M.D., and Nolan B. Money, M.D. 
(collectively the "Doctors"). Plaintiff initially brought this claim against both the 
Doctors and against Mountain View Hospital ("Mountain View"). However, after 
plaintiff failed to respond to Mountain View's discovery, and then violated the trial 
court's orders compelling this discovery, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs claim against 
Mountain View as a sanction. Over the next three years, the Doctors filed four separate 
motions to compel discovery to which plaintiff previously failed to respond. After 
2 
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plaintiff violated the trial court's order on their third motion to compel, the Doctors' 
moved for the sanction of dismissal of plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint in this 
case. The trial court granted the Doctors' motion, citing numerous examples of what the 
trial court found to be wilful and persistent dilatory tactics by plaintiff in responding to 
discovery. The trial court found that these tactics had frustrated the judicial process and 
therefore ordered that "[pjlaintiff s Second Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed 
without prejudice." 
B, Statement of Facts 
On August 2, 1993, plaintiff filed her Complaint in this action against, among 
others, the Doctors and Mountain View. (R. 4) On March 27, 1995, Mountain View 
filed a motion to compel plaintiffs response to Mountain View's first set of 
interrogatories and document requests, noting that close to four months had passed since 
Mountain View served this discovery and that plaintiff had yet to provide complete 
responses. (R. 273, 325-27) The trial court granted Mountain View's motion to compel 
and ordered plaintiff to respond to Mountain View's discovery. (R. 398-99) On April 11, 
1995, the Doctors filed a motion to compel, seeking an order requiring plaintiff to sign 
consent forms for the release of her medical records, noting that, two months after the 
Doctors requested these releases, plaintiff had yet to respond to this request. (R. 329, 
356) The trial court granted this motion. (R. 432) 
On May 8, 1995, Mountain View filed a motion to compel responses to its second 
set of interrogatories and document requests, noting that, two months after Mountain 
3 
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View served this discovery, plaintiff had yet to respond, despite Mountain View's letter 
requesting a response. (R. 369, 385-87) The trial court granted this motion, ordering 
plaintiff to produce the requested discovery within 20 days. (R. 396) On June 30, 1995, 
the Doctors filed another motion to compel, again seeking plaintiffs consent to release of 
medical records and information. (R. 400) The trial court granted this motion. (R. 432) 
By August 7, 1995, plaintiff had yet to respond to Mountain View's discovery, 
even though the trial court had ordered plaintiff to do so by July 5, 1995. (R. 423) 
Hence, Mountain View filed a motion seeking a default judgment as a sanction for 
plaintiffs violations of the trial court's discovery orders. (R. 423) The trial court granted 
Mountain View's motion, and struck plaintiffs complaint as against Mountain View. (R. 
432-34) 
On July 1, 1998, the Doctors' counsel took plaintiff s deposition. (R. 1046) 
During this deposition, plaintiff reiterated a previous claim that the Doctors' counsel had 
been following her, and that the Doctors' counsel was involved in a conspiracy against 
her. (R. 1006, 1044) In the course of these contentions, the following exchange took 
place between plaintiff and the Doctors'counsel: 
Q. Can you answer my question now, Mrs. Hales, about what it is that you 
believe I have been doing to interfere with your ability to obtain health care in the 
State of Utah? 
A- I feel you are rewriting my records. 
Q. And in what way? How am I supposedly doing that? 
A. Whiting them out. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Which records are you referring to? 
A. All my records, sir. 
Q. You believe that I have been whiting out your medical records; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you have you seen any records in which you believe I have whited out or 
changed any information? Can you answer my question, Mrs. Hales. Have 
you seen any record or document like that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have them with you today? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Where are they? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Where were they the last time that you saw them? 
A. At Mrs. Lloyd's house. 
[Plaintiffs counsel]: I think we can produce some today, Counsel, if 
you wanted to see them. I can find them right now. 
(R. 995-96) Insisting the documents before them were too voluminous, both plaintiff and 
her counsel refused to identify any of the allegedly altered documents, whereupon the 
following exchange occurred: 
Q. [Doctors' counsel] Mrs. Hales, are you willing to go through these 
documents to identify the materials that you claim have been altered and that relate 
to the claims that you are making against Dr. Oldroyd and Dr. Money? Are you 
willing to do that today? 
5 
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A. No. 
Q. All right. Then this deposition will be recessed. We will take the matter up 
with the judge and we will come back again on another day. My view—well, 
enough said, for the record, my position is these are materials this witness has 
indicated are relevant, that relate to her claims in this case. These materials are 
available for review today, she has declined to do that, and I am unable to pursue 
my examination based upon the witness's position. That will conclude the 
deposition at this time. 
(R. 1010-11) 
By July 28, 1998, plaintiff had not produced any of the so-called "altered 
documents," and the Doctors filed a motion to compel seeking production of these 
documents. The Doctors also sought sanctions for attorney's fees and costs incurred due 
to plaintiffs failure to provide these documents. On September 14, 1998, the trial court 
granted the Doctors' motion to compel and for sanctions, ordering plaintiff to respond to 
the Doctors' request for the altered documents within 30 days and to pay the Doctors' 
attorney fees and costs incurred in their motion to compel. (R. 1366-69) Also on 
September 14, 1998, the Doctors filed their fourth motion to compel, again seeking 
production of medical records which plaintiff had failed to provide. (R. 1344) 
By November 25, 1998, plaintiff had failed to respond in any way to the trial 
court's September 14, 1998 order that she produce the altered documents within 30 days. 
Consequently, the Doctors filed a motion for sanctions, seeking dismissal of plaintiff s 
Second Amended Complaint.1 (R. 1429,1452) In support of their motion for sanctions, 
1
 Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint on September 28, 1998. (R. 1395) 
6 
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the Doctors pointed to all of the delays caused by plaintiffs failure to respond to 
discovery and her violation of discovery orders, including the order to produce the altered 
documents. (R. 1443-52) 
On December 10, 1999, the trial court ruled in the Doctors' favor, dismissing 
plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1458) On March 17, 1999, the trial court 
entered an order on its ruling granting the Doctors' motion for sanctions. (R. 1607) In the 
order, the trial court detailed all of the motions to compel filed by the Doctors and 
Mountain View that were necessitated by plaintiffs failure to respond to discovery. (R. 
1605-06) The trial court also noted that plaintiff had previously violated court orders 
regarding discovery propounded by Mountain View, and that these violations had resulted 
in the dismissal of plaintiff s claim against Mountain View. (R. 1605-06) Finally, the 
trial court noted that plaintiff had violated its order requiring production of the altered 
documents. (R. 1606) Based on all of these facts, the trial court concluded that plaintiff 
had wilfully and persistently engaged in dilatory tactics, and that dismissal of her Second 
Amended Complaint was thus justified. (R. 1604-05) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
By the time the trial court ordered dismissal of plaintiff s Second Amended 
Complaint, plaintiff had engaged in a three-year pattern of delaying discovery in this 
case. Plaintiff persistently ignored discovery requests until the parties filed motions to 
compel responses, which the trial court invariably granted. On at least two occasions, 
plaintiff violated the trial court's order compelling responses to discovery requests. 
7 
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Additionally, plaintiff made wild accusations of record alteration and then refused to 
produce or even identify the allegedly altered documents, forcing the Doctors to seek and 
obtain an order from the trial court compelling production of these documents. When 
plaintiff failed to make even a cursory response or explanation in compliance with this 
order, the trial court determined that plaintiffs discovery abuses had compounded to a 
degree warranting dismissal of her claims against the Doctors. In addition to being 
warranted if not necessary under the circumstances, this decision was well within the trial 
court's discretion under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and should not be 
disturbed by this Court. 
In an effort to divert attention from her persistant discovery abuses, plaintiff insists 
that her grudging responses to discovery, in reply to motions to compel, the informal 
nature of some of the discovery, and the Doctors' legitimate motions and objections 
somehow excuse her discovery violations. However, under Utah law, none of these 
contentions alter plaintiffs duty to timely comply with discovery requests and court 
orders — a duty that plaintiff violated time and time again. Also, although plaintiff 
claims that she did not have possession of all of the requested documents, the record 
demonstrates that she did have actual possession of these documents, and that, in any 
event, she completely failed to raise her lack of possession has an objection to discovery. 
Likewise, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred by considering plaintiffs violations of 
orders compelling discovery requested by Mountain View completely ignores the overall 
delays caused by this conduct. Finally, plaintiffs argument that dismissing her lawsuit 
8 
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violated her constitutional rights ignores the fact that plaintiff was accorded every 
procedural opportunity and willingly chose to abuse these opportunities. Therefore, this 
Court should affirm the trial court's sanction of dismissal of plaintiff s Second Amended 
Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BASED ON PLAINTIFF'S VIOLATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ORDER, COMPOUNDED BY HER REPEATED DELAYS, THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
CHOSEN SANCTION 
Plaintiffs persistent and excessive dilatory tactics in responding to discovery 
warranted the sanction of dismissal and this Court should therefore affirm the trial court's 
ruling. 
[A] party's conduct merits sanctions under rule 37 if any of the following 
circumstances are found: (1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the party has 
acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the 
party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial 
process. 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 277 (Utah 1997). Harsh sanctions are 
particularly justified in response to "elusive and uncooperative" behavior in responding to 
discovery. Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). See also Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3) (for purposes of imposing sanctions, "an evasive or incomplete answer 
is to be treated as a failure to answer"). 
In responding to discovery in this case, plaintiffs conduct has ranged from elusive 
and uncooperative to completely nonresponsive, amounting to a chronic pattern of 
9 
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dilatory tactics which have frustrated the judicial process. For over three years plaintiff 
persistently failed to respond to discovery, forcing both the Doctors and Mountain View 
to seek court-ordered responses. In doing so, plaintiff has wilfully or knowingly created 
excessive procedural delays. 
For instance, regarding the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s claim against 
Mountain View due to her discovery violations, plaintiff concedes that she "was not able 
to sustain her cause of action against Mountain View, and chose to allow it to be 
dismissed by the court." (Appellant's Br. at 27). In other words, she knew she had no 
claim against Mountain View but, rather than assent to an expeditious dismissal, she 
chose to ignore Mountain View's discovery, force Mountain View to obtain an order on a 
motion to compel, defy this order, and then "allow" her claim to be dismissed by the court 
as a sanction — all the while stymieing the judicial process for both the Doctors and 
Mountain View. In addition to violating the trial court's order on Mountain View's two 
motions to compel, plaintiff failed to respond to the Doctors' discovery, forcing them to 
file four separate motions to compel — all of which the trial court granted. On six 
separate occasions, plaintiff forced the parties to seek judicial intervention to compel 
discovery responses, creating persistent and needless delays. 
Finally, plaintiff defied the trial court's order mandating a response to the Doctors' 
request for production of the altered documents. At this point, plaintiffs persistent 
dilatory tactics had compounded to such a degree that the trial court exercised its 
discretion to impose the sanction of dismissal. The trial court had previously awarded 
10 
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attorney's fees as a sanction, but this obviously did not deter plaintiff from abusing the 
discovery process. Consequently, the trial court opted for the more severe sanction of 
dismissal. This decision was entirely warranted under the circumstances and certainly did 
not constitute a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's dismissal order. 
In this appeal, plaintiff contends that her occasional responses to the Doctors' 
discovery somehow excuse her pattern of delays. However, all of the responses cited by 
plaintiff came after the Doctors were constrained to file motions compelling such 
responses. "[0]nce the motion for sanctions has been filed, the opposing party may not 
preclude their imposition by making a belated response in the interim between the filing 
of the motion for sanctions and the hearing on the motion." W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Incr. -
v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 737 (Utah 1977). Hence, notwithstanding her 
grudging responses to the Doctors' discovery, plaintiff still caused persistent delays and 
the trial court thus correctly imposed the sanction of dismissal. 
Plaintiff also claims that, because not all of her discovery violations involved 
actually defying the trial court's orders, this Court should find an abuse of discretion. 
However, the discovery violation which ultimately swayed the trial court to impose the 
sanction of dismissal was plaintiffs violation of the trial court's order to produce the 
altered documents. After plaintiffs deposition was recessed due to her refusal to produce 
the allegedly altered documents, the trial court ordered plaintiff to produce these 
documents within 30 days so that the Doctors could depose plaintiff as to these 
11 
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documents when her deposition resumed. Yet, to this day, plaintiff has failed to produce 
any documents. 
Plaintiff insists that she found no altered documents and was therefore not required 
to respond to the trial court's order. However, at no time within the 30 days following the 
trial court's order did plaintiff inform the Doctors or the trial court that no documents 
could be located. Plaintiff also failed to inform the Doctors or the trial court as to what 
measures, if any, she had taken to locate these documents. Consequently, the Doctors 
could not resume deposing plaintiff because they still had no idea which documents 
plaintiff contended were altered. The trial court entered its order to avoid this very 
situation and plaintiffs violation of the order thus warranted dismissal. See W.W. & 
W.B. Gardner, Inc., 568 P.2d at 737 (affirming dismissal because "[pjlaintiff had not 
undertaken to object to the [discovery], to request additional time, or to explain or justify 
his failure to answer"); Tuck v. Godfrey, 981 P.2d 407, 413 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(affirming dismissal where party had "'done virtually nothing' since the prior sanction 
hearing"). 
Also, in addition to plaintiffs violation of its order, the trial court dismissed 
plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint based on her failure to respond to discovery, a 
ruling permitted by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d). Rule 37(d) "allows a court to 
impose sanctions against a party for disregarding discovery obligations even when that 
party has not directly violated a court order specifically compelling discovery." Schoney 
v. Memorial Estates, Inc.. 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Hence, 
12 
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notwithstanding plaintiffs violation of a court order, dismissal was an appropriate 
sanction based on her disregard of discovery obligations. 
Indeed, plaintiffs violation of the trial court's order was the culmination of a 
protracted pattern of delaying the proceedings in this case by abusing the discovery 
process.2 Based on this conduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
plaintiffs claims against the Doctors and this Court should therefore affirm the trial 
court's ruling. 
IL PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE RELEASES FOR MEDICAL 
RECORDS WHICH WERE IN HER ACTUAL POSSESSION 
Although her failure to sign medical release forms was merely one of many 
dilatory tactics, plaintiff takes issue with the trial court's reliance on this dereliction, 
contending that the records sought by the release forms were not within her possession. 
However, the Doctors requested releases that would enable them to obtain records, not 
the records themselves. Moreover, for purposes of responding to Rule 34 record requests, 
a party has actual control of the records if they can direct the records' custodian to 
produce them, which plaintiff could have done. S>££ Tuck v. Godfrey, 981 P.2d 407, 413 
n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Moreover, even if she did not have possession of the records, 
plaintiff was obligated to object to the discovery requesting these records, or to seek a 
2
 Particularly troubling is plaintiffs contention that the trial court's failure to enter a 
formal order on each ruling somehow excuses plaintiffs discovery violations. "Although 
the trial court [may] not specifically designate [an] order as such," parties must still 
respond if "the court's ruling . . . inarguably compelled discovery." Preston & Chambers, 
P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
13 
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protective order, not to simply ignore the request. See id. "[T]he failure to [serve a 
written response to discovery requests] may not be excused on the ground that the 
discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a 
protective order." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d). Because plaintiff failed to object to the 
Doctors' request that she sign medical release forms, she is deemed to have waived any 
objection on appeal. See luck, 981 P.2d at 413. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
PARTIALLY BASING ITS SANCTION ON PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE 
TO SIGN INFORMALLY-REQUESTED RELEASE FORMS 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by partly basing dismissal on her failure 
to respond to informally-requested discovery.3 However, the "[t]ime, place, and manner 
requirements relating to discovery are committed to the [court's] discretion [and the 
court] has sufficient discretion to require discovery practices that are fair and effective in 
the circumstances of the pending controversy." Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 675 P.2d 1135,1144 (Utah 1983). See also Preston & Chambers, P,C. v. Koller, 
943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming trial court's dismissal based, in part, 
on dilatory actions in responding to informal letter requesting discovery). After plaintiff 
ignored the Doctors' informal request for her signature on medical release forms, the trial 
3
 None of the rules cited by plaintiff stand for the proposition that all discovery must 
necessarily conform to rigid formalities. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d)(3) permits 
sanctions to be imposed for failure to respond to document requests served upon the responding 
party. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires court submissions to have a valid 
factual and legal basis. Rule 4-502 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration prohibits parties 
from filing discovery requests with the court and requires parties to file certificates of service for 
formal discovery. 
14 
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court entered an order compelling discovery in this regard, a decision entirely within the 
court's discretion. Concluding that plaintiffs failure to respond to the Doctors' informal 
requests was one of many dilatory tactics justifying dismissal was also within the trial 
court's discretion. 
Moreover, plaintiff was required to challenge technical failures in the Doctors' 
discovery in an objection or motion for protective order, and her failure to take either of 
these actions constitutes a waiver of this claim on appeal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d); 
Tuck, 981 P.2d at 413. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in partially 
basing its sanction on plaintiffs failure to respond to informal discovery. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
PARTIALLY BASING DISMISSAL ON PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
RESPOND TO MOUNTAIN VIEW'S DISCOVERY 
Although plaintiffs delays in responding to the Doctors' discovery alone 
warranted dismissal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering plaintiffs 
delays in responding to Mountain View's discovery in imposing this sanction. "A party 
to an action has a right to have the benefits of discovery procedure promptly, not only in 
order that he may have ample time to prepare his case, but also in order to bring to light 
facts which may entitle him to summary judgment or induce settlement prior to trial." 
W.W. & W.B, Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977). 
Hence, contrary to plaintiffs arguments, the Doctors were entitled to the benefits of 
discovery procedure, not just responses to their discovery. In other words, as parties to 
plaintiffs action, the Doctors were entitled to the benefits of plaintiff s responses to 
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Mountain View's discovery. These responses may have assisted the Doctors in preparing 
their case, revealed facts which entitled them to summary judgment, or induced 
settlement. By ignoring Mountain View's discovery, plaintiff deprived the Doctors of 
these benefits and it was thus appropriate to include plaintiffs failure to respond to 
Mountain View's discovery among her many other discovery violations which warranted 
dismissal. 
Rule 37 sanctions are designed to prevent persistent dilatory tactics. Plaintiff 
ignored Mountain View's discovery and violated orders to produce that discovery, 
holding up the entire litigation in this matter. Plaintiff then persisted in these delays 
against the Doctors. At this point plaintiff cannot escape the consequences of her delays 
simply because they were inflicted upon two separate parties. Thus, the trial court 
properly considered plaintiffs failure to respond to Mountain View's discovery in 
imposing the sanction of dismissal. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT BASE ITS SANCTION ON 
PLAINTIFF'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT DISCOVERY FROM HER 
FORMER COUNSEL 
In support of dismissal, the trial court articulated specific dilatory tactics engaged 
in by plaintiff, none of which included her refusal to permit discovery from her former 
counsel. In their motion seeking sanctions against plaintiff, the Doctors noted that 
plaintiff had capriciously invoked a non-existent claim of attorney-client privilege which 
further stalled discovery. However, the trial court did not adopt this fact as a basis for 
imposing the sanction of dismissal. Yet, plaintiff raises the validity of her attorney-client 
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privilege claim on appeal as if the trial court had actually incorporated this issue into its 
ruling. In reality, the trial court had a vast body of dilatory conduct and discovery abuses 
upon which to base dismissal, and did not need to include plaintiffs invalid privilege 
claim as a ground for its order. Hence, in reviewing this order on appeal, plaintiffs 
contentions regarding the propriety of her refusal to permit discovery from her former 
counsel should not be considered. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS SANCTION ON PLAINTIFF'S 
UNNECESSARY DELAYS 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint based on the 
delays caused by her repetitive discovery abuses, and, contrary to plaintiffs claims, the 
Doctors' legitimate motions and objections do not mitigate her delays. Plaintiff insists 
that her failing to respond to discovery and her violations of court orders should be 
excused because the Doctors filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and 
because they objected during the depositions of plaintiff and her expert. However, the 
Doctors' conduct was entirely permissible under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
certainly not sanctionable. In contrast, ignoring discovery and violating a court's 
discovery orders is impermissible and sanctionable under Rule 37. Even if "everyone, 
including the court, shares some blame for [the] delay, . . . . the primary responsibility for 
moving the case along rest[s] with plaintiffs" and dismissing a plaintiffs claim for delays 
in responding to discovery is still appropriate. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 
P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Rather than taking responsibility for moving the 
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case along, plaintiff repeatedly caused needless delays. In light of these delays, the 
Doctors' legitimate motions and objections do not excuse plaintiffs conduct or support a 
finding that the trial court abused its discretion. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S SANCTION DID NOT VIOLATE 
PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Dismissal of plaintiff s action did not violate her state or federal due process rights 
because plaintiff was given every opportunity to pursue her case and chose to abuse this 
opportunity. "Although [this Court has] recognize[d] that a party must be given an 
opportunity to be heard, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when a party pursues a 
claim in a manner that abuses that opportunity." Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 
P.2d 260, 263 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming dismissal of malpractice claim for 
discovery delays). As with the dismissal based on discovery delays affirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in UDOT v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah 1995), "[tjhis is not a case 
where a confused and unassisted layman was thrown out of the courthouse simply for 
missing a discovery deadline." Plaintiff was represented by counsel at all times and had 
every opportunity to respond to the Doctors' discovery, provide partial responses, or 
object to the discovery. Instead, plaintiff repeatedly chose to either provide no response 
until she faced motions to compel, or to violate the trial court's orders on motions to 
compel. These are not the "relatively trivial" discovery violations discussed in Justice 
Stewart's dissent in Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 280 (Utah 1997) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Rather, plaintiff has persistently engaged in egregious discovery 
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violations which warrant the sanction of dismissal. Based on these flagrant violations, 
and on the numerous opportunities plaintiff was given to comport with discovery rules, 
dismissing plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint did not violate her constitutional 
rights. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's order imposing this sanction. 
CONCLUSION 
Because this Court accords great deference to the trial court's decision to dismiss 
plaintiffs lawsuit as a discovery sanction, and because plaintiffs discovery violations 
were particularly egregious and persistent, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of October, 1999. 
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
Curtis J. Drake 
Scott C. Sandberg 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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